Abstract. The rock-paper-scissor game -which is characterized by three strategies R,P,S, satisfying the non-transitive relations S excludes P, P excludes R, and R excludes S -serves as a simple prototype for studying more complex non-transitive systems. For well-mixed systems where interactions result in fitness reductions of the losers exceeding fitness gains of the winners, classical theory predicts that two strategies go extinct. The effects of spatial heterogeneity and dispersal rates on this outcome are analyzed using a general framework for evolutionary games in patchy landscapes. The analysis reveals that coexistence is determined by the rates at which dominant strategies invade a landscape occupied by the subordinate strategy (e.g. rock invades a landscape occupied by scissors) and the rates at which subordinate strategies get excluded in a landscape occupied by the dominant strategy (e.g. scissor gets excluded in a landscape occupied by rock). These invasion and exclusion rates correspond to eigenvalues of the linearized dynamics near single strategy equilibria. Coexistence occurs when the product of the invasion rates exceeds the product of the exclusion rates. Provided there is sufficient spatial variation in payoffs, the analysis identifies a critical dispersal rate d * required for regional persistence. For dispersal rates below d * , the product of the invasion rates exceed the product of the exclusion rates and the rock-paper-scissor metacommunities persist regionally despite being extinction prone locally. For dispersal rates above d * , the product of the exclusion rates exceed the product of the invasion rates and the strategies are extinction prone. These results highlight the delicate interplay between spatial heterogeneity and dispersal in mediating long-term outcomes for evolutionary games.
Introduction
Since its inception over 30 years ago evolutionary game theory has become a major theoretical 1 framework for studying the evolution of frequency dependent systems in biology [Maynard Smith, if the corresponding vertices are connected by an edge. This approach leads to a network based 27 formulation of evolutionary game theory in which the evolutionary dynamics on the graph is deter-28 mined by a suitable deterministic or stochastic analogue of the replicator dynamics. Evolutionary 29 games on graphs have been rather well studied [Nowak and May, 1992 cooperation is always driven to extinction by defection.
36
An alternative way of modeling a structured population is to assume that it is composed of a 37 number of local populations, within which individuals interact randomly, coupled by dispersal. In 38 this approach the total population or community is modeled as a metapopulation or metacommu-39 nity. Metapopulation and metacommunity structure is known to have important implications for 40 population dynamics in ecology and evolution [Hanski, 1999 , Holyoak et al., 2005 , Schreiber, 2010 .
41
In spite of the considerable amount of work that has been devoted to understanding the eco-42 logical and genetic consequences of metacommunity structure there has been much less attention 43 devoted to studying the dynamics of evolutionary game theory in the metacommunity context.
44
The purpose of this paper is to provide a general mathematical formulation of metacommunity 45 evolutionary game dynamics, and to obtain detailed results for the case of a particularly interesting 46 game -the rock-paper-scissors game. In the last few years the rock-paper-scissor game, which might initially seem to be of purely theoretical interest, has emerged as playing an important role in de-48 scribing the behavior of various real-world systems. These include the evolution of alternative male 49 mating strategies in the side-blotched lizard Uta Stansburiana [Sinervo and Lively, 1996] , the in 50 vitro evolution of bacterial populations [Kerr et al., 2002 , Nahum et al., 2011 , the in vivo evolution 51 of bacterial populations in mice [Kirkup and Riley, 2004] , and the competition between genotypes 52 and species in plant communities [Lankau and Strauss, 2007, Cameron et al., 2009 ]. More generally,
53
of the payoff matrix [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998 ]. If the determinant of the payoff matrix is 66 positive then the replicator dynamics converges to a stable limit point, in which the frequencies of 67 the three strategies tend to constant values. If, however, the determinant of the payoff matrix is 68 negative then the replicator dynamics converges to a heteroclinic cycle, in which the frequencies 69 of the three strategies continue to undergo increasingly extreme oscillations. In the latter case the 70 frequencies of the different strategies successively fall to lower and lower levels as the population 71 dynamics approach the heteroclinic attractor. Consequently, stochasticity would result in the ul-72 timate extinction of one of the strategies followed by the elimination of the remaining dominated 73 strategy.
74
In this paper we study the dynamics of the rock-scissors-paper game in a metacommunity 
Model and Methods

81
Evolutionary Games in Space.
82
We consider interacting populations playing m distinct strategies (i = 1, . . . , m) in a spatially 83 heterogeneous environment consisting of n patches (r = 1, . . . , n). Space is the primary limiting 84 resource for the populations and assumed to be fully saturated i.e. all sites within a patch are net payoff equals i A ij (r)x r j . All individuals in patch r experience a per-capita mortality rate m r .
90
Dying individuals free up space that can be colonized with equal likelihood by all offspring living 91 in the patch. In the absence of dispersal, the probability that a site emptied by a dying individual 92 gets colonized by an offspring playing strategy i is
. Thus, in the absence of dispersal, 
To account for movement between patches, let d sr denote the fraction of progeny born in patch s 95 that move to patch r. In which case, the rate at which offspring of strategy i arrive in patch r equals 96 s d sr j A ij (s)x s i x s j and the probability an offspring playing strategy i colonizes an emptied site
. Hence, the full spatial dynamics are
We assume that the matrix D of dispersal probabilities is primitive (i.e. after sufficiently many 99 generations, the decedents of any individual in any one patch occupy all patches).
100
For the rock-paper-scissor game, there are three strategies with rock as strategy 1, paper as 101 strategy 2, and scissor as strategy 3. Let a r be the basal reproductive rate of an individual in patch 102 r. Let b r i (i.e. the benefit to the winner) be the payoff to strategy i in patch r when it wins against its subordinate strategy, and −c r i (i.e. the cost to the loser) be the payoff to strategy i in patch r 104 when it loses against the dominant strategy. Under these assumptions, the payoff matrix in patch 
Results
127
Local coexistence
128
We begin by studying the behavior of the within-patch dynamics (1) in the absence of disper- 
Interestingly, inequality (4) is equivalent to the determinant of the payoff matrix being positive.
139
When coexistence occurs, the heteroclinic cycle of the boundary of the population state space is 140 repelling and there is a positive global attractor for the within-patch dynamics (Fig. 1a) . When in-
141
equality (4) is reversed, the heteroclinic cycle on the boundary is attracting (Fig. 1b) . The strategies 142 asymptotically cycle between three states (rock-dominated, paper-dominated, scissor-dominated),
143
and the frequencies of the under-represented strategies asymptotically approach zero. Hence, all 144 but one strategy goes extinct when accounting for finite population sizes.
145
Metacommunity coexistence.
146
Analytical results. When the patches are coupled by dispersal, we show in Appendix A that 147 for any pair of strategies, the dominant strategy competitively excludes the subordinate strat- and x r 2 = x r 3 = 0 for all patches r. Linearizing the paper strategy dynamics at the rock equilibrium
Equivalently, if x 2 = (x 1 2 , . . . , x n 2 ) T where T denotes transpose, then
where I is the identity matrix, Ψ is the diagonal matrix with entries 1/ s d 1s a s , . at the rock equilibrium yields
where C 3 is the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries c 1 3 , . . . , c n 3 . Corresponding to the fact that 163 scissor strategy is displaced by the rock strategy, the stability modulus of −mI
is negative. We call this negative of this stability modulus E 3 , the exclusion rate of strategy 3.
165
By linearizing around the other pure strategy equilibria, we can define the invasion rates I i for 166 each strategy invading its subordinate strategy and the exclusion rates E i for each strategy being 167 excluded by its dominant strategy.
168
Appendix A shows that the metapopulation persists if the product of the invasion rates exceeds 169 the product of the exclusion rates:
If the inequality (5) is reversed, then the metapopulation is extinction prone as initial conditions 171 near the boundary converge to the heteroclinic cycle and all but one strategy is lost regionally. critical dispersal rate below which persistence is possible (Appendix C).
177
At sufficiently low dispersal rates i.e d rr ≈ 0 for all r, the metacommunity coexistence crite-178 rion (5) simplifies to
Unlike the local coexistence criterion (4) benefit exceeds the geometric mean of the spatially averaged cost:
Since (7) implies (6), it follows that persistence of well-mixed communities implies persistence of i.e. p sr is a dispersal kernel that describes how dispersing individuals redistribute across patches.
194
Under these assumptions, the fraction d rs of individuals in patch r dispersing to patch s = r equals 
210
Local coexistence requires that the benefit b r to the winner must exceed the cost c r to the loser. For Unlike the difference between the products of invasion and exclusion rates, the minimum frequency 226 of strategies exhibits a highly nonlinear response to increasing dispersal rates (Fig 2b) : the minimal (Figs. 3a,c) . As a consequence, local diversity is maximal at intermediate dispersal 234
rates. At high dispersal rates, the population dynamics synchronize across space as they approach 235 the heteroclinic cycle (Figs. 3a,d ). Therefore, provided that b high is sufficiently large, coupling the communities by any level of dispersal 247 mediates regional coexistence despite local communities being extinction prone.
248
Consistent with these analytical predictions, Fig. 4 (Fig. 4b) .
254
Discussion
255
The rock-paper-scissors game represents the prototypical situation in which the components of a convergence toward a heteroclinic attractor on the boundary of the strategy space, and this process 267 must ultimately result in the extinction of some strategies [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998 ].
268
It is widely believed in ecology that the inclusion of spatial structure, in which the interactions 
302
In this paper we have adopted the metacommunity perspective to formulate a new approach to studying the dynamics of spatially structured communities in which rock-paper-scissors-type in-
304
teractions hold. This approach assumes that the overall metacommunity is composed of a number 305 of local communities, within each of which the interactions are panmictic, and that the local pop- species is possible, while if it is exceeded species extinctions occur.
358
We also note that a further example of a lattice model that has been used to study the effect 359 of spatial structure in maintaining meta-community persistence in a system with non-transitive 360 interactions occurs in the area of prebiotic evolution. Eigen and Schuster [1979] observed that there 361 is a fundamental problem in the evolution of self-replicating molecules: there exists an information 362 threshold since the length of the molecule is restricted by the accuracy of the replication process. been studied using a cellular automaton model in [Boerlijst and Hogeweg, 1991] . It is shown in 375 this model that local spatial interactions result in the formation of self-organized spiral waves, and 376 that selection acting between these spiral waves can counteract the effect of selection acting at the 377 level of the individual molecules, with the consequence that the hypercycle can be resistant to the 378 evolution of parasitic mutants.
379
The metacommunity model we have introduced here provides a complementary approach to 380 the lattice models that have previously been used to study coexistence in rock- 
